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1 Introduction
The eﬀect of capital inﬂows on growth during the period of ﬁnancial globalization in
the world economy has attracted a lot of interest in recent years. Textbook economic
theory would predict that capital inﬂows should be conducive to growth as capi-
tal moves towards economies with better investment opportunities and is a source
of technological spillovers. However, empirical evidence has failed to ﬁnd a robust
association between these variables. A substantial body of empirical evidence has
emerged in recent years1 showing that the growth impact of capital ﬂows appears
elusive. The impact depends on variables such as the level of economic development,
ﬁnancial depth, institutional quality, and the nature of capital ﬂows. Also, most gains
are associated to TFP growth rather than capital accumulation. The external asset
position of countries also appears to matter. A puzzling observation commonly found
in the literature is that there is a positive correlation between net capital outﬂows
and growth (see Prasad et al, 2007). Closely related to the so-called “Lucas paradox”,
countries running current account surpluses and with higher savings rates grew faster
than capital importing countries.
We present a model that attempts to explain this evidence by focusing on the role
played by international credit constraints within an overlapping generations (OLG)
endogenous growth setting. The model is able to generate either positive or negative
growth eﬀects of capital inﬂows as well as a role for domestic savings for the success
of liberalization policies. Contrary to the emphasis in much of the previous literature,
our focus here is on countries whose autarky interest rate is above the world interest
rate such that, when opening up, they would run current account deﬁcits. In this
sense, our approach departs from the literature on the Lucas paradox, but comple-
ments it by analyzing the growth eﬀects of capital inﬂows in deﬁcit economies. The
endogenous growth setting also allows us to discuss long-run growth rather than sim-
ply transitional dynamics. The model departs from the small open economy (SOE)
setting assuming that foreign investment is restricted to be a percentage of the cap-
ital stock of the economy.2 This restriction is exogenous, and we use changes in it
to model capital account liberalizations. However, the amount agents can borrow in
international credit markets is endogenously determined.3 In this framework, agents
cannot commit with collateral and there are enforcement constraints that determine
the amount agents can borrow on the credit markets. Our endogenous growth setting
has a reproducible factor that generates externalities and leads to permanent growth
1See, among others, Aizenman and Sushko (2011), Beckaert et al (2005, 2011), Kose et al (2011),
Kose et al (2009), Obstfeld (2009), and Prasad et al (2007).
2Foreign investment in our model is a claim on the physical capital stock of the country, which
includes FDI and equity inﬂows.
3See Azariadis and Lambertini (2003) and Kehoe and Levine (1993).
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in steady state.4 For simplicity, we will call this factor “human-capital”. We also
introduce physical capital accumulation and a pay-as-you-go pension system. This
allows us to have determinacy and a unique steady state which can either be con-
strained or unconstrained and the impact of capital ﬂows on growth depends on the
nature of the steady state.
Our model is better thought of as representing the case of an emerging market with
high domestic marginal product of capital and with a history of past debt commitment
problems potentially preventing it from borrowing optimally. The eﬀect of opening up
to capital inﬂows will depend on the steady state, which is a function of the savings
rate, human capital externalities, and the pensions system among other variables.
The intuition behind this result is that a rise in foreign investment inﬂows tends to
increase physical capital and thus lower its marginal product. Since we focus on the
case where the domestic interest rate exceeds the world interest rate, agents borrow
in international credit markets to ﬁnance investment in human capital. When they
enter the economy, agents choose their level of education ﬁnanced by a credit. Since
they cannot commit, they can choose to either reimburse or not this loan when they
are middle-aged. If they reimburse, they can beneﬁt from access to asset markets and
save between their middle-age and old-age. If they default, they cannot participate
in asset markets, and only consume the pension when they are old. This is because,
otherwise, their assets would be seized by international ﬁnancial markets. The higher
the domestic interest rate, the more incentive agents have to refund their loan since
the return on savings is higher. We thus obtain that the impact of capital inﬂows on
growth depends on the nature of the steady state. In both steady states it leads to a
rise in physical capital, a decrease in the domestic interest rate and a rise in domestic
wages. In a constrained economy, however, domestic interest rates are too low and
agents have no incentives to refund their loans. As a result, the amount they can
borrow will be endogenously constrained and they under-invest in education. As a
consequence, growth falls. In an unconstrained economy, on the other hand, domestic
interest rates are high enough to incentive agents to refund their loans and they can
reach the optimal level of education. Capital inﬂows then increase growth because
they lead to a reduction of domestic interest rates - which still remain high enough
- and an increase in wages. The return on human capital is higher and so is the
optimal level of education and economic growth. Any factor whose increase is able
to generate a rise in domestic interest rates, such as the rate of time preference, is
likely to drive the economy from the constrained to the unconstrained steady state.
We thus ﬁnd that, as in Aghion et al (2009), domestic savings matter for growth.
This setting also allows us to present a quantitative exercise. We ﬁrst assess
the likelihood of economies converging to the constrained steady state given a set of
4See De La Croix and Michel (2007).
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calibrated parameters obtained from data. We then look at what would the required
savings rate or public pension outlays be for these economies to converge to the
unconstrained steady state. We ﬁnally assess the growth eﬀects of increased capital
inﬂows in the model. We carry out this exercise using parameter calibration values
for Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Greece, Italy, Spain, and the UK. We ﬁnd that,
for the majority of these economies, there is a high likelihood of converging to the
constrained steady state, especially if human capital externalities are high. For a
large number of countries, we also ﬁnd that the savings rate and the public pension
outlays required to converge to the unconstrained steady state is much larger (much
lower in the case of pension contributions) than the one observed in data. We also
ﬁnd that the growth eﬀects of capital ﬂows are quantitatively small in most cases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief discussion
of evidence and the literature. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 analyzes the
equilibrium in a no-commitment setting. Section 5 discusses equilibrium dynamics.
Section 6 focuses on the relationship between capital ﬂows and economic growth.
Section 7 presents a quantitative exercise, and section 8 concludes.
2 Literature and evidence: discussion
As mentioned above, most of the related literature has focused on the eﬀect of growth
on capital ﬂows in a context where liberalizing countries display low autarky interest
rates and, as a consequence, export capital as they grow. This relates to the “Lucas
Paradox” whereby capital appears to be ﬂowing “up-stream” from capital-poor to
capital-rich countries. Prasad et al (2007), for instance, show that the correlation
between per capita GDP growth and the average current account (CA) to GDP ratio
is positive and signiﬁcant. Related to this paradox is the phenomenon of Global
Imbalances (GIs) and the shift in the sources of world savings from developed to
emerging countries since the late 1990s. Special focus has been placed on the role
played by China and diﬀerential levels of ﬁnancial sector development to explain these
phenomena. Although our paper deals with the opposite situation where countries’
autarky interest rate exceeds the world interest rate, it is worth understanding some
of the mechanisms relating growth and capital ﬂows in the literature to contextualize
our analysis.
Much of the literature on GIs has studied the phenomenon as a consequence of
equilibrium capital ﬂows placing emphasis on either the supply or demand of assets
that allow for risk diversiﬁcation. Caballero et al (2008), for instance, identify the
diﬀerential supply of safe assets as the main driving force behind capital ﬂowing from
emerging to developed countries. As developed countries oﬀer less volatile and safer
returns, savers tilt their portfolios towards countries with deeper ﬁnancial sectors.
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An analogous argument is used in Mendoza et al (2009), who focus on the role of
limited contract enforcement in emerging countries’ ﬁnancial markets. A large body of
literature has since developed to explain the coincidence between the Chinese growth
acceleration and GIs.5 Several of these papers share in common the existence of a
precautionary savings motive and incomplete markets. Because of the impossibility of
insuring against idiosyncratic income risk with incomplete markets, a precautionary
savings motive arises. This increases the supply of savings and drives a wedge between
the marginal product of capital and the interest rate. When these countries liberalize
their capital accounts to countries with more risk diversiﬁcation opportunities and
TFP increases, they become net exporters of capital. The focus is mostly on the
relationship running from TFP growth to the generation of excess savings and hence
CA surpluses. These models are adequate to explain GIs and the experience of
countries such as China. However, as Henry (2007) shows, in most cases, capital
account liberalization entails a decrease in the cost of capital. Figure 1 illustrates this
point. It plots the cost of capital around periods of capital account liberalizations in
the 2000s for Brazil, Chile and Colombia. Following Henry (2007), we calculate the
cost of capital using the (daily) FTSE dividend yield.6 The ﬁgure shows a decrease
in the cost of capital after capital account liberalizations for these countries.
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Figure 1: Liberalization and the cost of capital in Latin America.
5See, for instance, Angeletos and Panousi (2011), Broner and Ventura (2010), Buera and Shin
(2009), Carroll and Jeanne (2009), Sandri (2010) and Song et al (2011) amongst many others.
6Periods of capital account liberalization are identiﬁed using the Chinn and Ito (2007) index com-
bined with the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) dataset. We deﬁne capital account liberalization as a
change of the Chinn-Ito index from negative to positive. We also check whether this is accompanied
by a substantial (ex-post) increase in the ratio of foreign assets plus liabilities as a percentage of
GDP.
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As in our model, Aoki et al (2010) introduce credit constraints using a Kiyotaki-
Moore type7 setting with domestic and international borrowing constraints. They
show that, when the domestic ﬁnancial system is underdeveloped, capital account
liberalization is not necessarily beneﬁcial for growth because it can lead to TFP
stagnation in the long-run or short-run employment losses. Their setting, however,
does not consider endogenous growth. The models presented in Aghion et al (2009)
and Song et al (2011) also share common features with ours in that domestic savings
matter for growth. In Aghion et al (2009) growth is driven by countries acquiring
best practice technologies from abroad by attracting FDI. Savings matter because
foreign investors require knowledge from local entrepreneurs. Local entrepreneurs,
in turn, require savings to put equity in the partnership with foreign investors. In
Song et al (2011) they explain Chinese growth and high savings rates in terms of the
dual structure of Chinese ﬁrms with state owned and private ﬁrms. Private ﬁrms are
the source of growth but are credit constrained and hence require savings to expand.
These savings arise from the inequality that develops between managers and workers
as only managers beneﬁt from growth. This explains the positive correlation between
growth and savings and, by implication, the CA.
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Figure 2: Current account and growth rate diﬀerence between post- and
pre-liberalization. Deﬁcit countries.
As already noted, most of the literature focuses on savings surplus countries. How-
ever, the positive association between the CA and growth also happens for deﬁcit
7See Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
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countries. Figure 2 plots the diﬀerence between pre- and post-liberalization growth
performance against initial CA to GDP ratio for 24 deﬁcit countries between 1975
and 2010.8 It shows that the growth success of capital account liberalization policies
is positively correlated with the CA. Thus, even for countries that are net foreign bor-
rowers, savings seem to matter for growth after opening up the capital account to cap-
ital inﬂows. Table 1 also shows the growth diﬀerence from pre- to post-liberalization
periods by for three groups of CA deﬁcit countries.9 The countries are grouped as
high or low savings according to whether domestic savings are above or below the
average of their group. The growth diﬀerence in diﬀerences between high and low
saving countries is always positive.
Table 1: Change in GDP growth before and after capital account
liberalization (CA deﬁcit countries)
Savings rate group Change in growth rate
OECD High 0.197
Low -0.199
Diﬀerence High-Low 0.396
Latin America High 0.821
Low 0.602
Diﬀerence High-Low 0.219
South East Asia High -0.143
Low -1.309
Diﬀerence High-Low 1.166
Our model thus focuses on deﬁcit countries for which capital inﬂows may change
the incentives to repay back international private loans. This generates an endogenous
credit constraint that is determined by a “willingness to pay” motive rather than a
“capacity to borrow” motive as in models with exogenous collateral constraints (see
Arellano and Mendoza, 2002). The model features endogenous growth and achieves
determinacy by introducing capital and a pay-as-you-go pensions system. This allows
us to focus on the role of savings and public pension outlays as key determinants of
the steady state towards which the economy converges. The return on savings and the
8Countries are classiﬁed as deﬁcit countries if the average CA position before the liberalization
episode is negative.
9The groups of countries considered are as follows. OECD: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK.Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. South East
Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand.
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pensions system determine income after working age and hence the incentive to repay
the credit acquired to build human capital. This, in turn, determines whether opening
up to foreign capital inﬂows will have beneﬁcial or detrimental eﬀects on growth.
Given these characteristics, our model is better suited to analyze the experience of
Latin American countries and several Southern European countries especially after
the sovereign debt turmoil since 2010.
3 Model
We consider an overlapping generations model with accumulation of productivity
enhancing activities (human capital in a loose sense) and an endogenous credit con-
straint as in De La Croix and Michel (2007). In this framework, we introduce physical
capital accumulation and a pay-as-you-go pension system and assume that the econ-
omy has access to international credit markets at the exogenous world interest rate
factor RW .
3.1 Production
Consider a perfectly competitive economy in which the ﬁnal output is produced using
physical capital K and human capital H . The production function of a representative
ﬁrm is F (Kt, Ht) ≡ Htf (kt) with k ≡ K/H. Capital fully depreciates each period.
Assumption 1. f(k) is Cr over R+ for r large enough, increasing (f
′(k) > 0) and
concave (f ′′(k) < 0) over R++.
The domestic interest factor Rt and the wage rate wt then satisfy:
wt = f (kt)− ktf
′ (kt) , Rt = f
′ (kt) .
3.2 Households
Population growth rate is n. The typical household lives for 3 periods. An agent born
in t− 1 draws utility from consumption when middle-aged ct and old dt+1
V = u (ct, dt+1) (1)
Assumption 2. The utility function u(., .) is increasing in its arguments and con-
cave; it is homogeneous of degree one (homothetic preferences) and satisﬁes the Inada
conditions.
Individuals born at period t borrow bt-1 amount of good when young to build up
their human capital ht for the middle-aged period. When middle-aged, they receive
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a wage wtht, with wt the wage per unit of eﬃcient labor, and pay a proportional tax
τ ∈ (0, 1) to ﬁnance a balanced pension system. When old, they are retired and receive
an amount pt+1 = (1 + n)τwt+1ht+1 issued from a pay-as-you-go system. Following
De La Croix and Michel (2007), we assume that human capital accumulation is given
by
ht = Ab
λ
t−1h
1−λ
t−1 (2)
with education productivity denoted by A > 0, and 0 < λ < 1 being the education
externality. Human capital depends on individual investment bt-1 and on the inherited
human capital of the previous generation ht-1. This latter eﬀect may be viewed
as inter-generational transmission of human capital or as the externality eﬀect of
society’s education level. In our preferred wider sense, 1−λ would reﬂect productivity
or knowledge spillovers from the previous generation’s stock of technological know-
how on the current generation’s stock. bt−1 is the investment eﬀort of the current
generation on productivity enhancing activities.
Assumption 3. The domestic interest factor Rt is greater than the constant world
interest factor RW ∀t.
10
Under this assumption, as interest rates are lower in the international credit mar-
ket than in the domestic market, households will always prefer to save in the domestic
market and borrow in the international market.11 We further assume that there is no
possibility of collateralizing human capital.
Let us consider successively the agents’ choices under a commitment and a no-
commitment setting.
3.3 Optimal decisions in a commitment setting
In a commitment setting, agents born in t − 1 refund their loan bt−1 at time t and
their potential middle-age loan st at time t + 1. From Assumption 3, they can save
an amount st at time t on the domestic market and get the domestic return Rt+1.
Thus, the period budget constraints are
ct = wtht(1− τ)− st −RW bt−1, (3)
dt+1 = pt+1 +Rt+1st,
10This assumption will be satisﬁed as long as domestic capital intensity in steady state is low
enough relative to world capital intensity and initially the domestic capital intensity is not too high.
11For simplicity, we assume that agents cannot arbitrage by borrowing internationally and lending
at home. This assumption does not change the results of the model, but allows us to obtain simpler
analytical solutions by ignoring arbitrage proﬁts. This can be conceptualized as representing a
situation where a national investment bank borrows in international markets on behalf of households
for their human capital investment, but households can only save at home and borrow from the
national bank. This national bank, in turn, has the ability to seize household savings in case of
default as we will see below.
8
where RW is the interest factor paid on international loans. Under Assumption 3, the
debt each young agent contracts to ﬁnance her education is a loan from foreigners.
We denote ω1 ﬁrst period income and ω2 second period income.
ω1t = wtht(1− τ)−RW bt−1
ω2t+1 = pt+1
As the level of education determines the life cycle income, and the amount of sav-
ing determines the allocation of the consumption between middle age and retirement
in order to maximize welfare, the two optimal decisions can be computed indepen-
dently. We proceed into two steps. First, we determine optimal savings and, second,
considering the education level as given, we then compute the optimal education level.
max
st
u (ω1t − st, ω2t+1 +Rt+1st) .
The FOC is
−u′1 (ct, dt+1) +Rt+1u
′
2 (ct, dt+1) = 0,
which can be written in implicit form as:
dt+1
ct
= μ (Rt+1) . (4)
Then, optimal savings are given by
s∗t =
μ (Rt+1)ω1t − ω2t+1
Rt+1 + μ (Rt+1)
. (5)
To facilitate the algebra, we deﬁne xt, the debt repayment as a percentage of
income. Using ht = Ab
λ
t−1h
1−λ
t−1 and et−1 = bt−1/ht−1, debt repayment is
xt =
RW bt−1
wtht
=
RW b
1−λ
t−1
wtAh
1−λ
t−1
=
RW
wtA
e1−λt−1 . (6)
We can then rewrite ω1 and ω2 as
ω1t = (1− τ − xt)wtht, (7)
ω2t+1 = τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1. (8)
The pension system is a convenient assumption since then the third period income
does not depend on the agent’s human capital or her education choice. Thus the
optimal level of education only maximizes ω1.Agents born in period t− 1 choose the
education investment level in order to maximize period t income
max
et−1
ω1t = max
et−1
wtht(1− τ)− RW bt−1.
9
Using ht = Ae
λ
t−1ht−1 and et−1 = bt−1/ht−1, we have
max
et−1
ω1t = max
et−1
ht−1
(
(1− τ)wtAe
λ
t−1 − RW et−1
)
.
The FOC gives the optimal level of investment in education
e∗t−1 =
(
(1− τ)wtAλ
RW
) 1
1−λ
, (9)
and the optimal level of repayment
x∗t =
RW
wtA
e∗1−λt−1 = λ(1− τ). (10)
Note that the optimal repayment level only depends on pension contributions (τ) and
the education externality parameter (λ).
3.4 Optimal decisions in a no commitment setting
Since there is no collateral for loans, agents can choose to refund or default on cred-
its.12 In this no commitment setting, an endogenous constraint emerges. When
adults, agents can choose to either refund or default on their education loan. If they
decide to reimburse, they are allowed to participate in asset markets next period and
budget constraints are similar to equations (3). If they decide not to reimburse their
credit, they will be excluded from all asset markets forever. If they attempted to go
back to capital markets their savings would be seized to pay the outstanding debt.13
In this case, they cannot save and budget constraints are
ct = wtht(1− τ) (11)
dt+1 = pt+1
The problem of the consumer born in t − 1 is to maximize its utility (1) subject to
the human capital accumulation technology (2), the budget constraints (3) and the
following individual rationality constraints (IRC):
1. IRC old-age: The middle-age agents are not allowed to borrow because they
would rationally never reimburse their debt when old. Hence savings should be
nonnegative:
st ≥ 0 (12)
12A pension system is considered in the model because a second period income is necessary to
consider endogenous debt constraints. If households do not receive a retirement income, they will
always pay back their loan to be able to save in middle age and thus to consume when retired.
13Note that here we do not assume only ‘reputational’ costs as in the early debt default literature
(Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981) but also the possibility of asset seizing hence impeding any sort of
smoothing through saving (Bulow and Rogoﬀ, 1989).
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2. IRC middle-age: The utility of repaying the debt and hence being able to save
should be larger than the utility obtained from consuming only labor income in
each period. This constraint can be written as:
max
st
u (ω1t − st, ω2t+1 +Rt+1st) ≥ u (wtht(1− τ), (1 + n)τwt+1ht+1) (13)
or combining (12) and (13) we obtain a unique IRC:
max
st≥0
u (ω1t − st, ω2t+1 +Rt+1st) ≥ u (wtht(1− τ), (1 + n)τwt+1ht+1)
with Rt observed and Rt+1 expected, kt is predetermined.
In this no-commitment setting, when the IRC old age holds, we know that agents
have incentive to save. Nevertheless, they may have no incentive to refund their
loans under IRC middle age, since the associated loss is higher than the gain from
saving.
Let V be the indirect utility with commitment:
V (ω1t, ω2t+1, Rt+1) = max
st
u (ω1t − st, ω2t+1 +Rt+1st) ,
and V + be the indirect utility considering IRC old age:
V + (ω1t, ω2t+1, Rt+1) = max
st≥0
u (ω1t − st, ω2t+1 +Rt+1st) .
We ﬁrst look for the upper bound on borrowing which constrains education invest-
ment, taking temporarily Rt−1 and Rt as given. In this no-commitment setting,
investors will lend only when agents are willing to refund their loans. We deﬁne the
bound x¯ as the one that equalizes utility when refunding and defaulting. We then
obtain the eﬀective level of saving and borrowing (s˜ and x˜) comparing the optimal
and the constrained levels.
Proposition 1. Under assumption 2, if τ(1+n)
(1−τ)
≥ μ (Rt+1)
wtht
wt+1ht+1
then s∗t ≤ 0 and
x˜t = s˜t = 0. Otherwise, s˜t = s
∗
t > 0 and x˜t = Min(x
∗
t , x¯t) with x¯t the solution of
(Rt+1(1− τ − x¯t)wtht + τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1)u
′
2 (ct, dt+1) =
u ((1− τ)wtht, τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1) (14)
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Proof: Substituting equation (7) and (8) into equation (5), we get:
s∗t =
μ (Rt+1) (1− τ − xt)wtht − τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1
Rt+1 + μ (Rt+1)
(15)
If xt = 0 and
τ(1+n)
(1−τ)
≥ μ (Rt+1)
wtht
wt+1ht+1
, then s∗t ≤ 0, agents have no incentive to
save even when they do not borrow. As s∗t is decreasing with xt, we still have s
∗
t ≤ 0
when xt > 0. It follows that, under IRC old age, optimal savings are equal to zero
whatever xt ≥ 0. Finally, under
τ(1+n)
(1−τ)
≥ μ (Rt+1)
wtht
wt+1ht+1
, the maximum level of
borrowing is x¯ = 0. If xt = 0 and
τ(1+n)
(1−τ)
< μ (Rt+1)
wtht
wt+1ht+1
, then s∗t > 0. Hence,
there is a bound xmax > 0 such that, when xt ≥ xmax, then s
∗
t ≥ 0 and thus V
+ = V.
The IRC middle age gives a second upper bound x¯ < xmax above which the agent
will not refund, meaning that no loan will be granted. Under IRC old-age, IRC middle
age can be written as
V + (wtht (1− τ − xt) , τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1, Rt+1) ≥ (16)
u (wtht(1− τ), τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1) .
Using the homogeneity of the utility function, V (ω1, ω2, R) = (Rω1 + ω2) u
′
2, the IRC
constraint (16) can be rewritten as:
(Rt+1(1− τ − xt)wtht + τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1)u
′
2 (ct, dt+1) ≥
u (wtht(1− τ), τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1) .
We ﬁnally determine the borrowing limit x¯ as the solution of equation (14).
We deﬁne Δt+1 as the discounted wage growth rate between t and t+ 1:
Δt+1 ≡
wt+1ht+1
wthtRt+1
=
kt+1
αkαt
Aet
λ. (17)
The introduction of Δt+1 will simplify the analytical solution of the model and allows
for graphical representations.
From equation (14), the level of the threshold x¯ depends on the pension tax pa-
rameter τ . Thus, we can analyze the impact of the government choice of τ (economic
policy) on households’ borrowing and investment in education.
Corollary 1. The utility of default u (wtht(1− τ), τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1) is increasing
with τ if and only if τ < 1 − c where c ≡ cu
′
1(c, d)/u(c, d). The indirect utility
V + (wtht (1− τ − xt) , τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1, Rt+1) is increasing with τ if and only if (1+
n)Δt+1 > 1.
12
Proof:
The derivative of the utility of default with respect to τ is positive if and only if :
wthtu
′
1 (wtht(1− τ), τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1) < (1 + n)u
′
2 (wtht(1− τ), τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1) .
(18)
Using the homogeneity property of the utility function:
u (wtht(1− τ), τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1) = wtht(1− τ)u
′
1 (wtht(1− τ), τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1)
+τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1u
′
2 (wtht(1− τ), τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1) .
Inequality (18) is equivalent to τ < 1−c. Using the Euler equation (4), the derivative
of the indirect utility with respect to τ is:
dV +
dτ
(c∗, μ(R)d∗) = u′1(c
∗, μ(R)d∗)
dc∗
dτ
+ u′2(c
∗, μ(R)d∗)μ(R)
dc∗
dτ
. (19)
Which carries the sign of dc∗/dτ = βwtht ((1 + n)Δt+1 − 1).
As the utility function is homogeneous of degree one, we can compute 1 − c =
μ(R)/(R + μ(R)) which is the optimal saving rate. A change in τ will aﬀect the
middle age rationality constraint (16) in two ways.
i. In case of default, agents cannot save. Their second period income is only
the pay as you go pension. An increase in τ will decrease their middle age
consumption and increase their old age consumption. When τ is lower than the
optimal saving rate, a rise in τ makes intertemporal consumption choices closer
to what the optimal choices would be (in case of access to the saving market).
When τ is lower than this optimal saving rate, a rise in τ will increase the utility
of default, which is the right hand side of the middle age rationality constraint
(16). Thus, this rise in τ tightens the constraint.
ii. In the case of refund, agents have access to ﬁnancial markets. Thus there are
two ways of transferring income from the middle age to the old age period:
the pay-as-you go pension system and saving. The condition (1 + n)Δt+1 > 1
can be rewritten (1 + n)wt+1ht+1/wtht > Rt+1, and thus means that the return
from the pension system is higher than the return from private savings. In
that case, when τ is raised, the utility of refund increases. The left hand side of
the middle age rationality constraint (16) is higher which relaxes the constraint.
Hence, we ﬁnd four cases. When τ < 1 − c and (1 + n)Δt+1 < 1, a rise in τ
will always tighten the constraint, which means that x¯ will decrease with τ . When
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τ > 1−c and (1+n)Δt+1 > 1, x¯ will always increase with τ . Whereas when τ < 1−c
and (1 + n)Δt+1 > 1, or τ > 1 − c (1 + n)Δt+1 > 1, the sign of the variation of x¯
with respect to τ is ambiguous.
We now consider simple speciﬁcations of the utility and production functions, to
derive explicitly the value of the bound x¯ that determines the maximum repayment
(and borrowing) allowed by international credit markets.
Assumption 4. Preferences are represented by the utility function u(ct, dt+1) =
cβt d
1−β
t+1 with 0 < β < 1. The production function is f(kt) = k
α
t with α ∈ (0, 1).
From equation (14), considering these simple functions, we can compute explicitly
x¯t ≡ x¯(Δt+1). We obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 2. Under assumption 4, the eﬀective loan is
x˜t = Min (x
∗, x¯t) (20)
= Min (λ(1− τ), 1− τ − η(Δt+1)) ,
where
η(Δt+1) =
(
τ(1 + n)
1− β
)1−β (
1− τ
β
)β
Δt+1
1−β − τ(1 + n)Δt+1. (21)
When x∗ > x¯t agents are constrained in their education investment choice, whereas
they are unconstrained when x∗ < x¯t. Given equation (6), we also obtain the con-
strained education investment level:
e¯t−1 =
(
wtA
RW
x¯t
) 1
1−λ
. (22)
3.5 Macroeconomic equilibrium
Under assumption 3, agents prefer to save at home and borrow in the international
market. We consider that foreign inﬂows of FDI and equity are policy-restricted. This
allows us to model the eﬀect of a liberalization policy that allows for increased foreign
ownership in the economy’s capital stock. We thus have the following assumption:
Assumption 5. Foreigners cannot hold more than a proportion φ ∈ [0, 1) of the total
domestic capital stock.
Macroeconomic equilibrium consists of:
i. The labor market equilibrium:
Ht = Nt−1ht. (23)
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ii. The asset market equilibrium:
Kt+1 = Nt−1st + φKt+1 ⇔ (1− φ)Kt+1 = Nt−1st. (24)
Under assumptions 3 and 5, the asset market equilibrium condition equalizes the
available capital stock in period t + 1 to the amount of domestic savings in period t
plus the amount of foreign capital invested in the country: Since Kt+1 = kt+1Ht+1,
then (1− φ)kt+1Ht+1 = Nt−1st. Dividing by Nt−1ht we obtain:
(1− φ)(1 + n)Aeλtkt+1 =
st
ht
. (25)
Under assumption 4, optimal savings from equation (5) become:
st
ht
= wt ((1− β)(1− τ − xt)− β(1 + n)τΔt+1) . (26)
And we can rewrite the asset market equilibrium equation (25) as:
(1− φ)(1 + n)Aeλt kt+1 = wt ((1− β)(1− τ − xt)− β(1 + n)τΔt+1) . (27)
Since equation (17) implies that
Δt+1 =
Aeλt
wt
1− α
α
kt+1, (28)
the equilibrium equation is ﬁnally:
(1 + n)Δt+1((1− φ)
α
1− α
+ βτ) = (1− β)(1− τ − xt). (29)
If we denote by xˆ the equilibrium debt repayment, then:
xˆt ≡ xˆt(Δt+1) = 1− τ −
(
(1− φ)
α
1− α
+ βτ
)
(1 + n)
1− β
Δt+1. (30)
An equilibrium is an intertemporal sequence (kt, xt)
+∞
t=0 which solves the ﬁrm’s
and the consumer’s programs, and such that markets clear. Thus, a perfect foresight
equilibrium is deﬁned by Δt+1 such that in period t the eﬀective optimal choice
considering the constraint x˜, from equation (21), is equal to the equilibrium value xˆ,
from equation (30). Since from these equations x˜t and xˆt are functions of Δt+1 for all
t ≥ 0 and intersect only once, then for a given economy, the exists a unique value of
Δt+1 = Δ corresponding to the equilibrium. The equilibrium discounted wage growth
rate Δ is characterized by a set of parameters, and is constant whatever the initial
condition k0 (see next section). Nevertheless, capital intensity kt will dynamically
adjust from this initial condition k0. Figure 3 depicts the equilibrium, which can
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Figure 3: The Dark curve represents eﬀective x (optimal under the IRC
constrainst). Case 1 (resp. Case 2) gives the equilibrium EˆB1 (resp. EˆB2) when
market clearing conditions are represented by curve xˆ1(Δ) (resp. curve xˆ2(Δ)).
either be unconstrained (EˆB1) or constrained (EˆB2). For instance, the unconstrained
equilibrium would correspond to an economy B1 whose public pensions system size,
τ , is small whereas the constrained one would correspond to an economy B2 where
τ is high. A policy decreasing τ may change the equilibrium from constrained to
unconstrained. Likewise, other relevant parameter changes, including the degree of
openness φ and the savings rate (determined by β) can aﬀect the equilibrium towards
which the economy converges.
4 Equilibrium dynamics
Proposition 2. For any initial condition k0 > 0, an economy where 0 < φ < 1
converges to a unique steady state equilibrium. But depending of the parameter values,
two conﬁgurations can occur:
i. If β(1− λ) ≥
(
τ(1−α)
(1−φ)α−τ(1−α)
) 1−β
β
, the economy is unconstrained and the steady
state is ku = Ω
1−λ
αλ+(1−λ)(1−α)
u R
λ
αλ+(1−λ)(1−α)
W with
Ωu ≡
α(1− τ)(1− λ)Q
A
1
1−λ ((1− α)λ(1− τ))
λ
1−λ
, (31)
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with
Q ≡
1− β
(1 + n)((1− φ) α
1−α
+ βτ)
. (32)
ii. If β(1 − λ) <
(
τ(1−α)
(1−φ)α−τ(1−α)
) 1−β
β
, the economy is constrained and the steady
state is kc = Ω
1−λ
αλ+(1−λ)(1−α)
c R
λ
αλ+(1−λ)(1−α)
W with
Ωc ≡
αΔc
A
1
1−λ
(
(1− α)
(
1− τ − Δc
Q
)) λ
1−λ
. (33)
Proof: see Appendix A.
The analysis of the model’s dynamics implies that, whatever the initial condition
k0, the economy will converge monotonically to the long run steady state. This steady
state is unconstrained if the parameters are such that β(1−λ) ≥
(
τ(1−α)
(1−φ)α−τ(1−α)
) 1−β
β
,
and constrained if β(1− λ) <
(
τ(1−α)
(1−φ)α−τ(1−α)
) 1−β
β
. Moreover, if parameters change (a
rise in φ for example) such that the economy moves from one regime to the other,
the economy just jumps to the new equilibrium path converging monotonically to the
new steady state.
5 Capital inﬂows and economic growth
The model describes an economy which can either be constrained or unconstrained
depending on parameters such as the size of the public pension (τ), population growth
(n), time preference (β) and, ﬁnally, the degree of ﬁnancial openness φ. We focus
here on the eﬀect of capital ﬂows on growth through parameter φ.
Proposition 3. Financial openness and equilibrium.
Under assumptions 3, 4, and 5, there is a unique value φ¯ such that the borrow-
ing constraint is active if and only if φ > φ¯ with φ¯ > 0 for λ < λ¯max =
1 − (α+βτ(1−α))
β(1−α)
(
1−α
τ(1−α)+α
) 1
β
τ
1−β
β . The bound φ¯ is decreasing with the pension tax
τ .
Proof: See Appendix B.
Proposition 3 deﬁnes a threshold for ﬁnancial openness φ¯ below (above) which an
economy is unconstrained (constrained) whatever the initial condition k0. Another
look at ﬁgure 3 illustrates the situation of country B. Initially, economy B is
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unconstrained and the equilibrium is EˆB1. An increase in openness rotates the
equilibrium doted line anti-clockwise and the new equilibrium is EˆB2. In this new
equilibrium, economy B is constrained. The calibration section provides some
examples of countries which may behave as country B. Since when the pension tax
τ increases the incentive to repay the educational loan decreases, the bound φ¯ is
decreasing with τ .
In our framework, the growth rate is given by the rate of growth of human capital:
ht+1
ht
= Abλt h
−λ
t = Ae
λ
t . (34)
Proposition 4. Financial openness and balanced growth path.
Under assumptions 3, 4 and 5, if φ ≤ φ¯ the economy is unconstrained, and if φ > φ¯
the economy is constrained. Let ε denote an increase in ﬁnancial openness such that,
initially, ﬁnancial openness is φ and becomes φ+ ε with liberalization.
i. When the economy is initially constrained (φ > φ¯), the growth rate is decreasing
with openness.
ii. When the economy is initially unconstrained (φ < φ¯) and remains unconstrained
(φ+ ε < φ¯), the growth rate is increasing with openness.
iii. When the economy is initially unconstrained (φ < φ¯) and becomes constrained
with openness (φ+ε > φ¯), the growth rate is ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing
with openness, with a maximum at φ¯.
Proof: see Appendix C.
The intuition behind this proposition 4 is as follows. An increase in openness
mechanically rises the stock of capital and thus increases the wage and decreases
the domestic interest rate. The way these changes aﬀect the economy depends on
the steady state. On Figure 4, the left panel corresponds to the case where an
initially constrained economy remains constrained whatever φ ∈ (0, 1). The interest
rate drop reduces agents’ incentives to save and incentive to refund their loan when
adult (interest rate eﬀect). Agents become endogenously more constrained and,
hence, education spending decreases. This means that, for an initially constrained
economy, openness is bad for growth.The second right panel corresponds to the case
where an initially unconstrained economy may become constrained with openness:
φ < φ¯ but φ + ε > φ¯. As long as φ ≤ φ¯, the economy remains unconstrained and
then the rise in w increases the incentive to invest in human capital (wage eﬀect).
Agents are unconstrained and can reach this higher level of education. This means
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Figure 4: Openness and growth: two conﬁgurations.
that, in an initially unconstrained economy, a moderate increase in capital inﬂows
is good for growth. Conversely, if φ + ε > φ¯, the interest rate eﬀect dominates and
the growth rate starts decreasing with openness. Nevertheless, the growth rate of
the open economy still exceeds the almost closed economy one as long as φ + ε < φ¯
with φ¯ such that, if we denote constrained and unconstrained growth respectively as
functions of ﬁnancial openness g¯ ≡ g¯ (φ) and g∗ = g∗ (φ), we have g¯
(
φ¯
)
= lim
φ→0
g∗ (φ).
Above this threshold φ¯, openness has a global negative eﬀect on growth.
To summarize, in the model, ﬁnancial openness is bad for growth if the economy is
initially constrained, or if openness becomes too large ( φ+ε > φ¯). This is because, for
given values of τ , β, λ, and n, the larger the capital inﬂows, the stronger is the interest
rate eﬀect and hence the incentive to default which constrains access to international
credit markets. The question is then, what the role of savings and policy variables is
in determining the success of liberalization policies. We address this question with a
quantitative exercise.
6 Quantitative analysis
We present a quantitative exercise in order to assess how likely the constrained steady
state is to happen for a series of selected countries. We also address a policy question:
what would be the required savings rate and/or public pension contributions required
to move the economy from the constrained to the unconstrained steady state? Finally,
we address quantitatively the growth gains of capital ﬂows under both equilibria. We
calibrate the model using data on eight countries. These countries have been selected
as they are relevant to the theory model. They include Latin American countries as
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well as Southern European countries. The selection among these is done on the basis
of data availability.
The parameters of the model are calibrated using data from diﬀerent sources.
Table 2 collects parameter values. We use pension outlays as a percentage of GDP
from OECD statistics and OECD Pensions at a Glance (2009) as a measure of τ .
Capital shares, α, are given in Caselli (2005), except for Brazil which is given by
Gomes et al. (2005). Parameter φ is the stock of FDI and equity investment as a
percentage of GDP (average for 1970-2007) from Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2007). This
is then transformed into a percentage of capital stock using the capital-labor ratio
from Caselli (2005). To calibrate the rate of time preference, namely β, we consider
data on the private savings rates (from WDI, Eurostat, OECD), on marginal product
of capital (R) from Caselli and Freyer (2007), working age population growth n (from
WDI), and output growth (from WDI). From the model, savings are given by
st =
[
wtht − R¯bt−1
]
(1− β)− βτ (1 + n)
wt+1ht+1
Rt+1
Along the steady path, we have kt+1 = kt = k, then wt+1 = wt = w and the saving
rate is
s
wh
	 (1− β)− βτ (1 + n) (1 + g)
1
R
(35)
Given R, g, τ and n we compute β from equation (35). Finally, education productivity
A is calibrated so as to match the rate of growth of per capita GDP for these economies
in the pre-liberalization period. For most countries, where available, we used data
from 1970 to 2010.
Table 2: Parameters calibration. Annualized rates.
n τ α φ R β
Brazil 0.047 0.080 0.250 0.075 0.076 0.760
Chile 0.035 0.040 0.160 0.250 0.090 0.758
Colombia 0.055 0.050 0.120 0.017 0.060 0.783
Greece 0.008 0.101 0.150 0.040 0.050 0.780
Italy 0.004 0.106 0.210 0.045 0.080 0.751
Mexico 0.054 0.007 0.250 0.077 0.090 0.768
Spain 0.012 0.077 0.240 0.080 0.090 0.777
Parameter λ represents the contribution of private education spending to human
capital accumulation. This elasticity is crucial to determine whether a country con-
verges to the constrained or the unconstrained steady state since it determines the
private returns to investment in human capital. However this is an elusive measure
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to proxy for at the country level. Hence, for robustness, we consider diﬀerent levels of
this elasticity with an upper bound of 0.35. Using Proposition 2, we can compute the
threshold φ¯. To determine whether a country is constrained or not in the long-run
we compare this threshold with the observed φ. For each country, Table 3 collects
the diﬀerent values of φ¯ (for three values of λ) and the last column gives the observed
value of φ. Comparing φ and φ¯, we can sort the countries in three groups. Greece
belongs to the group of countries that is always constrained even with a very low
level of λ. Mexico belongs to the group of countries that is always unconstrained
even with a high level of λ. The other countries may be in a constrained or un-
constrained equilibrium depending on λ. Table 3 also reports φ¯ for which increased
capital inﬂows would have a globally negative growth eﬀect. Only Italy exceeds this
threshold and Colombia is close to it. The rest of the countries (except for Greece
and Mexico) remains far from φ¯, i.e. could continue to increase openness to capital
inﬂows without harming growth.
Table 3: Calibrated φ¯ and φ¯ and observed φ
φ¯ φ¯ φ
λ=0.35 λ=0.25 λ=0.15
Brazil -0.698 0.066 0.518 0.366 0.075
Chile -0.515 0.170 0.573 0.520 0.250
Colombia -2.290 -0.720 0.140 0.023 0.017
Greece -4.267 -1.749 -0.355 - 0.040
Italy -1.756 -0.523 0.211 0.042 0.045
Mexico 0.829 0.908 0.954 - 0.077
Spain -1.184 -0.146 0.432 0.364 0.080
Given the importance of the savings rate and the policy parameter τ , we can
calculate what would be the implied savings rate and/or pension contribution that
would ensure convergence to an unconstrained steady state. Keeping all parameters
ﬁxed, we determine successively the threshold in β (or, alternatively, the saving rate)
and the threshold in τ . Table 4 collects these thresholds for two values of the elasticity
λ.14 For most countries, when λ = 0.35, the required savings rate is well above 1/3
of GDP. In the case of Greece, this ratio is 44%, i.e. a Chinese-like savings rate that
compares with an average of less than 18% since the mid 1970s. Likewise, the implied
τ threshold would require a dramatic reduction of the public pensions outlays as a
percentage of GDP for most countries, especially for Greece, Italy and Brazil. These
14We report these values only for λ = 0.25 and 0.35 since for λ = 0.15 most countries were
unconstrained and would hence require lower levels of τ and/or the savings rate.
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values are much lower if we consider λ = 0.25, although they still remain large relative
to current values for most countries.
Table 4: Threshold values of β, savings rate and τ to beneﬁt from capital inﬂows.
λ=0.35 λ=0.25
β s τ β s τ
Brazil 0.530 0.442 0.030 0.614 0.354 0.079
Chile 0.666 0.321 0.018 0.742 0.244 0.036
Colombia 0.620 0.360 0.011 0.740 0.250 0.024
Greece 0.530 0.442 0.012 0.614 0.354 0.026
Italy 0.599 0.386 0.032 0.681 0.302 0.063
Mexico 0.870 0.127 0.042 0.909 0.089 0.083
Spain 0.675 0.314 0.030 0.750 0.237 0.060
Finally, we calibrate the eﬀects of capital inﬂows on economic growth. The ex-
ercise we consider is as follows. Taking the threshold φ¯ for which openness reduces
growth, we calculate the eﬀect of a 150% increase in openness φ below and above the
threshold. That is, we consider the eﬀects of capital inﬂows on growth in the uncon-
strained (positive) and constrained (negative) steady states around the φ¯ threshold.
For example, Brazil experienced a per capita growth rate of 0.6974 per period before
liberalization. When φ rises from 0.34 to 0.51, in the unconstrained steady state,
Brazil’s growth rate increases to 0.719 per year.
Table 5 presents the results in terms of annualized growth rate changes for the
ﬁve countries that can fall in either steady state. The quantitative eﬀects of the
liberalization policy in the unconstrained steady state are small. The growth gains
are typically below 0.02% per year and, in some cases they are of the third decimal
point order. These small gains are consistent with the insigniﬁcant eﬀects found
in some empirical estimates. The negative growth eﬀects in the constrained steady
state are slightly more sizeable although never large. The largest negative eﬀect,
corresponding to Chile, would imply a growth loss of 0.6% per year. For the rest of
the countries, however, the growth eﬀect is less that -0.1% per year.
7 Conclusion
The eﬀect of capital inﬂows on growth has met with empirically mixed results. How-
ever, the observation that current account surplus countries tend to grow faster than
current account deﬁcit countries, has led to the development of a large literature
that analyzes the correlation between growth and capital ﬂows for surplus economies
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Table 5: Growth eﬀects of a 150% increase in φ.
Unconstrained Steady State
Initial φ Final φ Growth before Growth after
Brazil 0.340 0.510 0.697 0.719
Colombia 0.093 0.140 1.320 1.322
Chile 0.380 0.570 2.311 2.341
Italy 0.140 0.210 0.810 0.819
Spain 0.286 0.430 0.738 0.754
UK 0.280 0.420 0.407 0.416
Constrained Steady State
Initial φ Final φ Growth before Growth after
Brazil 0.520 0.780 0.697 0.523
Colombia 0.150 0.225 1.320 1.292
Chile 0.580 0.870 2.311 1.702
Italy 0.220 0.330 0.810 0.782
Spain 0.440 0.660 0.738 0.639
such as China, mostly in the context of exogenous growth models. This correla-
tion, however, also appears to hold for deﬁcit countries. Successful capital account
liberalizations also tend to be associated with higher savings rates.
In order to understand this phenomenon, we develop an OLG model of endoge-
nous growth and credit constraints for economies whose autarky interest rate is above
the world interest rate. Compatible with existing evidence, capital inﬂows may either
beneﬁt or harm growth. The model features endogenous growth through the accu-
mulation of productive knowledge (human capital). It also contains physical capital
and a pay-as-you go pensions system that ensure a unique equilibrium. Importantly,
since human capital is not collateralizable, access to international credit markets is
endogenously determined. The model features two unique equilibria. Countries can
either converge to a constrained or an unconstrained steady state.
In a constrained economy, because of default incentives, opening up to capital
inﬂows is bad for growth because it tightens credit constraints. Interest rates fall
and the return on savings falls giving agents less incentives to participate in asset
markets and hence more incentives to default on education investment loans. Thus,
they decrease savings and the accumulation of human capital having a negative eﬀect
on growth. Results are reversed in an unconstrained economy in which capital inﬂows
become growth enhancing since agents can reach their optimal human capital level.
We study the eﬀects of changes in some of the key parameters of the model to under-
stand the threshold nature of the capital ﬂows-economic growth nexus. Focusing on
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the eﬀect of openness to FDI and equity inﬂows, we carry out a quantitative exercise
analyzing the likelihood of a set of economies falling in either steady state and the
required savings rate and public pensions size that would make these economies un-
constrained. We also analyze the growth eﬀects of increased capital inﬂows and ﬁnd
them to be quantitatively small.
Our results can be used to understand a body of recent empirical evidence ﬁnd-
ing negative eﬀects of capital ﬂows on growth for poor and low savings economies.
Potential extensions of the model could consider the role of non-tradable sectors and
the real exchange rate. Since non-traded goods cannot be used to smooth consump-
tion intertemporally, changes in the real exchange rate can aﬀect the endogenous
constraint and hence lead to a relationship between (persistent) real exchange rate
changes and growth.
Appendices
A Proof of Proposition 2
Lemma 1. Whatever the parameters conﬁguration, the dynamics of the model can
be summarized by the dynamic equation
Ωik
α
t = k
1−λ+αλ
1−λ
t+1 RW
−λ
1−λ (36)
With Ωi > 0, i = u, c, for u unconstrained and c constrained.
Proof. Considering equations (6) and (17) which give the deﬁnitions of debt
repayment x and the wage growth rate Δ, we obtain a ﬁrst dynamic equation linking
x, Δ and k:
αΔt+1k
α
t = A
1
1−λk
1−λ+αλ
1−λ
t+1
(
(1− α)xt+1
RW
) λ
1−λ
(37)
The asset market equilibrium equation (29) gives a relationship between Δ and xˆ:
Δt+1 = (1− τ − xˆt)Q (38)
Substituting Δ from equation (38) into equation (37), we get:
αkαt (1− τ − xˆt)Q = A
1
1−λk
1−λ+αλ
1−λ
t+1
(
(1− α)xˆt+1
RW
) λ
1−λ
(39)
Consider ﬁrstly the unconstrained case where xˆt = x
∗ = λ(1− τ). Equation (39) can
be rewritten:
Ωuk
α
t = k
1−λ+αλ
1−λ
t+1 RW
−λ
1−λ (40)
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with
Ωu ≡
α(1− τ)(1− λ)Q
A
1
1−λ ((1− α)λ(1− τ))
λ
1−λ
. (41)
Consider secondly the constrained case where xˆt = x¯ = 1 − τ − η(Δt+1). From
equation (38) we obtain
Δt+1 = Δc =
⎛
⎜⎝
(
τ(1+n)
1−β
)1−β (
1−τ
β
)β
Q
1 + τ(1 + n)Q
⎞
⎟⎠
1
β
. (42)
Substituting into equation (38) we get:
Ωck
α
t = k
1−λ+αλ
1−λ
t+1 RW
−λ
1−λ , (43)
with
Ωc ≡
αΔc
A
1
1−λ
(
(1− α)
(
1− τ − Δc
Q
)) λ
1−λ
, (44)
which yields (36).
We consider that 0 < φ < 1 and agents can borrow at the international interest
rate, namely RW . Then equation (36) becomes:
kt+1 = Ω
1−λ
1−λ+αλ
i R
λ
1−λ+αλ
W k
α(1−λ)
1−λ+αλ
t . (45)
Again there are two steady state equilibria, the trivial one k = 0, and ˜˜ki =
Ω
1−λ
αλ+(1−λ)(1−α)
i R
λ
αλ+(1−λ)(1−α)
W . And for a given initial condition k0, the economy will
converge monotonically to the steady state ˜˜ki.
B Proof of Proposition 3
From equation (26), the condition st > 0 can be rewritten as xt < x0(Δt+1) with:
x0(Δt+1) ≡ 1− τ −
β
1− β
τ(1 + n)Δt+1. (46)
Then, from equations (46) and (30), the equilibrium is always such as the condition
s > 0 holds.
Moreover, x∗ is constant and x¯ is convex, ﬁrst decreasing and then increasing. As
x¯(0) = 1− τ and x∗ = λ(1− τ), then x∗ ≤ x¯(0).
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Let us denote Δ0 the value of Δ such that x
∗ corresponds to st = 0. If x¯(Δ0) < x
∗,
then there exists a unique value Δ1 such that when Δ < Δ1, x¯(Δ) > x
∗, and when
Δ > Δ1, x¯(Δ) < x
∗. This is illustrated by Figure 5.
x
Δ
x¯
x∗
x0
Δ0Δ1
Figure 5: Δ0 and Δ1
From equation (46), x∗ = x0(Δ) for Δ = Δ0 with
Δ0 =
(1− β)(1− τ)(1− λ)
βτ(1 + n)
,
and the value of x¯ corresponding to this Δ0:
x¯(Δ0) = (1− τ)
(
1 +
(1− β)(1− λ)
β
)
−
(1− τ)1−β(1− λ)1−β
β
.
Thus, x¯(Δ0) < x
∗ if and only if:
(1− τ)
(
1 +
(1− β)(1− λ)
β
)
−
(1− τ)1−β(1− λ)1−β
β
< λ(1− τ),
or
(1− τ)(1− λ)
β
<
(1− τ)1−β(1− λ)1−β
β
,
which is true as (1− τ)β(1− λ)β < 1.
So we have proved that, for Δ < Δ0, there is a unique intersection between x
∗
and x¯ as represented in ﬁgure 5. We now just need to determine Δ1. Let Δ¯ be the
value of Δ such that x¯(Δ¯) = xˆ(Δ¯) and Δ∗ be such that x∗ = xˆ(Δ∗):
Δ¯ =
(1− β)(1− τ)
β(1 + n)
(
1− α
(1− φ)α + τ(1− α)
) 1
β
τ
1−β
β , (47)
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and
Δ∗ =
(1− λ)(1− τ)(1− β)(1− α)
(1 + n) ((1− φ)α+ βτ(1− α))
. (48)
The equilibrium is constrained when Δ¯ is higher than Δ∗ which gives the condition
on φ.
We obtain φ¯ as solution of Δ∗ = Δ¯ which means that:
1
β
(
1− α
(1− φ¯)α + τ(1 − α)
) 1
β
τ
1−β
β =
(1− λ)(1− α)(
(1− φ¯)α + βτ(1− α)
) . (49)
Taking the log of this equation and diﬀerentiating with respect to τ and φ¯ gives:
dτ
(
−
1− α
(1− φ¯)α + τ(1− α)
+
β2(1− α)
(1− φ¯)α + βτ(1− α)
+
1− β
τ
)
+ (50)
dφ¯
(
α
(1− φ¯)α + τ(1− α)
βα
(1− φ¯)α+ βτ(1− α)
)
= 0, (51)
or equivalently:
dτ
(
(1− φ¯)α2(1− β)
τ
(
(1− φ¯)α+ τ(1 − α)
) (
(1− φ¯)α + βτ(1− α)τ
)
)
+ (52)
dφ¯
(
α2β(
(1− φ¯)α+ τ(1 − α)
) (
(1− φ¯)α + βτ(1− α)τ
)
)
= 0. (53)
From which we deduce the derivative of φ¯ with respect to τ :
dφ¯
dτ
= −
(1 − φ¯)(1− β)τ
α2β
, (54)
which is negative.
C Proof of Proposition 4
We consider, as in the Proposition, three diﬀerent cases.
i) In the case where the economy is initially constrained, from Proposition 3 the
economy remains constrained when φ is increasing.
In the long run, at the steady state k¯, equations (22) and (28)
can be rewritten:
k¯ =
(
RW
Ax¯(1− α)
) 1
α
e¯
1−λ
α (55)
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and
k¯ =
(
Δ¯α
A
) 1
1−α
e¯
−λ
1−α (56)
From these two equations, we can eliminate k¯ and deduce an expression for e¯ depend-
ing only on Δ¯ as, from equation (21), we know that x¯ is a function of Δ¯ :
e¯
1−λ
α
+ λ
1−α =
(
Δ¯α
A
) 1
1−α
(
Ax¯(1− α)
RW
) 1
α
≡ Φ(Δ¯). (57)
Since, from equation (47), we know that Δ¯ is increasing with φ and as the growth
rate is increasing with e¯, if we prove that e¯ is decreasing with Δ¯, this implies that the
growth rate g is decreasing with φ. Thus, to show that increasing openness decreases
long term growth, we just have to show that Φ′(Δ¯) > 0 for all Δ¯ in its deﬁnition set.
To be more precise, from Figure 3, it is clear that Δ¯ ∈ [Δmin,Δmax] where Δmin
is the value of Δ such as x¯ = x∗ and Δmax is the value of Δ such that x¯ = x0, x0
being the value of x making savings zero.
Lemma 2. The value Δmax corresponds to the minimum of the function x¯(Δ), and
is characterized by:
Δmax =
(1− β)(1− τ)
τ(1 + n)β
. (58)
The value Δmin is characterized by:
η(Δmin) = (1− λ)(1− τ). (59)
Proof:
From equation (21), the minimum of the function x¯(Δ) is
η(Δ)
Δ
=
β
1− β
τ(1 + n). (60)
From equation (46),
x0(Δ) = 1− τ −
β
1− β
τ(1 + n)Δ. (61)
And then x0 = x¯ iﬀ
1− τ −
β
1− β
τ(1 + n)Δ = 1− τ − ηβ. (62)
From equations (21) and (60), we can deduce the following expression:
ζΔ−βmax =
τ(1 + n)
1− β
, (63)
28
with
ζ ≡
(
τ(1 + n)
1− β
)1−β (
1− τ
β
)β
, (64)
from which we can obtain the expression of Δmax.
The lower bound Δmin is the solution of the equation x¯(Δmin) = x
∗(Δmin) which
means that
λ(1− τ) = 1− τ − η(Δmin)
and is equivalent to equation (60).
Now that we have clearly identiﬁed the interval where Δ¯ belongs, we compute
Φ′(Δ¯) and prove it is always positive.
Φ′(Δ¯) = Φ(Δ¯)
(
1
(1− α)Δ¯
+
1
α
dx¯
dΔ¯
1
x¯
)
(65)
As Φ(Δ¯) > 0, then Φ′(Δ¯) < 0 iﬀ:
1
(1− α)Δ¯
+
1
α
dx¯
dΔ¯
1
x¯
< 0, (66)
with
dx¯
dΔ¯
= −
dη(Δ¯)
dΔ¯
= −(1− β)
η(Δ¯)
Δ¯
+ βτ(1 + n). (67)
Substituting in equation (65), Φ′(Δ¯) < 0 iﬀ
α
(
1− τ − η(Δ¯
)
) + (1− α)
(
βτ(1 + n)Δ¯− (1− β)η(Δ¯)
)
< 0, (68)
iﬀ
(1− β + αβ)η(Δ¯)− (1− α)(1 + n)βτΔ¯− α(1− τ) > 0. (69)
Moreover, from equation (21), we know that
η(Δ¯) = ζΔ¯1−β − τ(1 + n)Δ¯, (70)
with ζ =
(
τ(1+n)
1−β
)1−β (
1−τ
β
)β
.
Thus Φ′(Δ¯) < 0 iﬀ Ψ(Δ¯) > 0, with
Ψ(Δ¯) ≡ (1− β(1− α))ζΔ¯1−β − (1 + n)τΔ¯ − α(1− τ). (71)
As Δ¯ belongs to the interval (Δmin,Δmax), we compute the value of the function
Ψ(Δ¯) at the two extremes.
Ψ(Δmin) = (1− τ) ((1− λ)(1− β(1− α))− α)− (1− α)(1 + n)βτΔmin, (72)
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Ψ(Δmax) = τ(1 + n)Δmax
(
βα
1− β
)
− α(1− τ) = 0. (73)
As
Ψ′(Δ¯) = (1− β)(1− β(1− α))ζΔ¯−β − (1 + n)τ, (74)
and
Ψ′′(Δ¯) = −β(1− β)(1− β(1− α))ζΔ¯−β1. (75)
Function Ψ′′(Δ¯) is concave. Then if Ψ′(Δmin) < 0, the slope of Ψ
′(Δ¯) being always
decreasing on the interval (Δmin,Δmax), that means that Ψ
′(Δ¯) is always negative
and then Ψ(Δmin) ≥ Ψ(Δ¯) ≥ 0. And as from equation (60)
η(Δmin)
Δmin
=
β
1− β
τ(1 + n), (76)
then
Ψ′(Δmin) = −β(1− α)(1 + n)τ < 0. (77)
We thus obtain that Ψ(Δ¯) > 0 for any Δ¯ ∈ (Δmin,Δmax), meaning that Φ
′(Δ¯) > 0
and thus that g is decreasing with φ.
ii) The economy is initially unconstrained and remains unconstrained with
openness. From Proposition 2, a rise in φ makes k∗ increasing. From equation
(9), we know e∗ =
(
λ(1−τ)A(1−α)
RW
) 1
1−λ
k∗
α
1−λ , and then e∗ increases with φ and so does g.
iii) From i), in an initially unconstrained economy, a rise in φ increases the growth
rate. When the economy becomes constrained, from ii), the growth rate decreases
with φ. From equations (6) and (17), when φ = φ¯, as x¯ = x∗ and Δ¯ = Δ∗, then
e¯ = e∗ and the growth rate is maximized.
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